Jojje OlssonThis week, the Swedish government published the country’s second national security strategy, replacing the first such document from 2017. For obvious reasons, Russia is named as the most serious security threat against Sweden in the 31 page long document. (English version here, 46 pages long.)
It is also remarkable how China is mentioned 20 times in the new national security strategy, compared to only once in the 2017 document, event though the two are of similar length.
China is first mentioned under the headline ”Global developments and trends”, as a supporter of the Russian war in the same sentence as Belarus and Iran:
This democratic backsliding thus undermines support for the rules-based world order. This also affects Sweden, as its security is ultimately based on states respecting international law, including the rules of the UN Charter.
Russia poses a serious threat to security throughout Europe. The security situation in Europe has been fundamentally reshaped as a result of the brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, which Russia is conducting with the direct or indirect support of Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea. The war is also significantly affecting global security, especially since a broad group of countries remain passive in the face of this obvious violation of the UN Charter. If Russia were to bring about a change of borders in Europe by military force, the security implications would also be serious in other parts of the world.
Under the headline ”Actor driven threats” China gets even more attention, almost without exception of the negative kind.
Among other things, China’s totalitarian development is said to constitute a direct threat to Sweden’s national security in itself. Sensitive issues such as repression against the Uyghurs are also mentioned, following several cases of refugee espionage against Chinese ethnic minorities in Sweden:
An armed attack by Russia on Sweden or one of our Allies is the pacing threat for the total defence that is now being built up within the framework of NATO’s collective defence. China is the world’s second-largest economy and a key international actor. China’s totalitarian development, geopolitical ambitions and efforts to reshape the rules-based world order pose a threat to Sweden’s national security. China’s military rearmament and modernisation affect security in Asia and throughout the world. China’s modernisation and expansion of its nuclear capabilities, coupled with a lack of transparency or commitment to arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons issues, can affect strategic stability and, in the long term, also have consequences for strategic deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region. China’s deepening partnership with Russia and indirect support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine contribute to the serious security situation in Europe. China has been moving in an increasingly totalitarian direction. The central role of the party is emphasised and the repression of dissidents and certain ethnic groups, such as the Uighurs, has worsened.
China’s ambition to become a world leader in new technology and its use of cyber capabilities also have consequences for our security and competitiveness. Furthermore, China’s ‘military-civil fusion’ requires private Chinese companies to share their technology with the Chinese military. Chinese actors also conduct systematic intelligence activities and security-threatening activities against Sweden and Swedish interests.
The broad range of methods that mainly Russia but also China, Iran and other actors use to influence Sweden can be grouped together under the heading of ‘hybrid threats’. These actors strive to exploit all vulnerabilities in our society to achieve their political or other objectives. The threats are aimed at actors at all levels of the Swedish public sector, but also at civil society, the private sector and individuals. The methods include cyber attacks, undue influence, economic pressure, sabotage, impact on critical flows, migration as an instrument of pressure, unlawful intelligence activities and the execution of attacks and other acts of violence.
The last mentions of China comes under the headline ”Key bilateral relations”. It is pointed out how Sweden needs to take into account the US security policy shift towards China, which echoes the comments of Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson upon Sweden’s entry to NATO earlier this year.
In an interview with Politico in March, Kristersson highlighted the need to pay attention to American security concerns regarding China in order to make the US committed to European security.
This section of the document also mentions the need to maintain a dialogue and trade with China – only to in the following sentence state the importance of reducing risks an vulnerable dependencies:
Sweden prioritises strengthening its broad bilateral relationship with the United States and will help maintain and strengthen transatlantic ties. At the same time, Sweden’s security policy needs to take into account the shift in the focus of US security policy towards the threat from China and the fact that the United States’ willingness to contribute to Europe’s security could be affected by domestic political conditions. Within the EU and NATO, Sweden emphasises the importance of this transatlantic link and is working to ensure that these organisations also remain relevant to the United States.
(…)
Sweden needs to maintain a dialogue and trade with China as well as cooperation in areas where it is appropriate and compatible with our national security. In order to strengthen our economic security and resilience, we also need to reduce risks and vulnerable dependencies in relation to China. It is also important to enhance our knowledge of China. Sweden’s relations with China must be anchored in a European strategy with close transatlantic cooperation.
The only mention China got in the last Swedish national security strategy from 2017 was with regards to a ”redistribution” of global power, where China together with India and ”several African and Latin American countries” are expected to be more politically and economically powerful in the future.
As an opposition leader, Ulf Kristersson repeatedly called for a tougher and more coherent Swedish China policy.
This ambition is clearly reflected in the national security strategy document released just before the NATO meeting in Washington this week, as well as by Kristersson’s comments to Swedish media at the same meeting that EU sanctions against China now might be in the cards.
